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Book Review:· BlAck Star - A View of the Life and Times 
of Kwflme Nl(rumal], by Basil DR.Vid son ( New York: Praeger 
Publi shers , 1974), 225 p. 
Many grea t men and wome n have e me rged in the leadershi p 
of the struggle for the liberation from colonialism on the 
vast African contiae nt. Basi l Davi~son, who has done so 
much to illuminate the history of that struggle, asserts 
that "hi s otry will place" Kwame 1krumah "at the heart and 
centj_re of the whole great process of pr i.mary decoloni zation."" 
Not a few African leaders concur: Sekou Toure made him co-
President o f Guniea after the coup in lihana; Kaunda n amErl a 
colleg e in Zambia after him; and Cabral recalled him as . "a 
companion in our struggle." 
In telling this s tory o f t he life of th~s first President 
of the f ).rst Sub-Saharan African nation to gain political in~ 
dependence after World War II, Davidson explamn s: 
But tcxiay, looking at his 1 if e and work, one has t o 
find a path to truth through all t ne blame and priase 
t ha t followed ln his wake; and it is not easy to find 
t h i.s Path. 'l'he fact is t hat n o final judgment is possi -
ble ~s ··yet; and a full biography of Nl{:rumah cannot be 
sensibly attempted at this t irne. 
What follows here is an attempt to show and to explain 
him in tl:le framework of his t i :ne s . an ef fo rt at compre -
hension that other historians, b e tter in s t ru ct: ed in the 
future, may correct or improve. '-' 
He adds: 
"To some exten t, necessarily, it is a personal me moir, 
for I knew him fairly well through many of those years •••• 
but I have tried to balance my own opinions a gainst those 
of others, for or agAin s t, and to t e ll t h i s story 'as it 
was.~~ 
I 
~ 
DRvidson' s book does add taluable insights into the man 
and his atte mpt to lead the Ghanaian people in their strugg le 
for political and econom 1 c independence. He p:e1~rays the con-
tradictory chA.racter ofNkruinah: A man of ideas forced to be-
I 
come a man of action; seeking to improve the life of his people 
with little real knowledge of them due to prolong ed absence from 
Ghana in his youth; aiming to build a continental revolution 
in a relatively small country where his countrymen accepted "a 
gentle process of reform •• aas being quite enough. 11 
The author describes how Nkrumah came ;to partial power in 
1951, leading a broad coalition .fo:t ! natiotle.l liberation; and 
was forced to compvmmise with the still-powerful British 
~vei ·~~I!~ rulers··: , accepting the inhibiting framework of 
inherited pol it icnl and econom le in s titutions they imposed~ 
He raises the quest ion of whether Nkrumah should have acee pted 
this hobbled status, especially in view of late~ events. The 
alternative, in a continent still fully anctjopenly ruled by the 
colonial powers, seemed to be an almost hopeless strugg le against 
overwhelming odds. Nk~umah's decision did create the conditions 
for Ghana's attainment of political independence, a first and 
major breakthrough in the strugg le for national liberation which, 
in the next decade, saw over 40 nations freed fDom outrigh t 
foreign rule. As Davidson points out, continuation. of the 
underlying institutional structure which · chained Ghana•.s 
~ocoa · economy .intp th~ :world capitalist system was the heavy 
price he ·and his followers paid. 
Dsvidson exposes tJ;ie growj_ng weaknesses of Nkrumah's politi-
cal party as its 'petty bourgeois' leade~ship succumeed to 
oppprtunistic, bureaucratic and authoritarian practices which 
rendered it incapable of leading the na tton forward beyond the 
hollow shell of political independence • .de explains Nkrumn.h's 
inabilit y to deal ~ffectively wit ~ these increasing problems 
as the decade of the ~ixties opened:: 
Nkrumah can be criticised for much that he did or failed 
to do; but the underlying truth, by tnls time, was t hat he 
had become ~he victim of a situation that increasing ly 
escaped his c ontrol , or even hi s influence. Trying t o 
recover some c ontrol, he moved increasingly towards a 
. per.sonal assert 1on of autnor ity, substituting his will 
for t ha t of t he pa rty, ju s t as the party hid long since, 
by now, substituted its wi ll f or that of the voters •• 0 ~ 
By· the mid-• s1xt ie s, '- -- · ··· · · .- · !. ' 
The manipulation of factions was fast becoming Nkrumah's 
sole effective mcde of action: his resignation could be 
the only other choice. 
Davidson points out that r esignation and 'going to the 
pe o ple' would have required 'long years of obscure and pat lent 
work' to build an alternative to the CPP ., Nkrumah, appnrent l y 
convinced tha t the keys of power were now i n his hand, sought it'!Jtt.ct..J. 
to use t hem to open the 0 1ocks that still i'.r1pr isoned Ghana in 
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F1rst, Nkrumah never really understood tne nature of the 
class strugg le in Ghana. While in Guinea, years after he was 
deposed, he wrote a pamphlet on cl~ ss struggle in Africa; but 
while he was President, he explicitly denied tha t Ghana was 
l 
t:eing increasingly rent by a serious internal class conflict. 
His verbal emphR.sis wa s on t he dang er of nee-colonial forces --
the powerful foreig n compan ies that continued to dominate A ff'1 :c·.:('. ..-
~J!~~-"-~~.._ but he fail ed to ex pose tne !::~:~· \~.t" £\ 
~~ wealthy cocoa far mers-cum-traders..;,cum-businessmen 
as -an increasing ly powerful political-economic force ~Ihich • · . ·, 
thwarted essential internal structural change. Efforts to or-
ganize the sharec~oppers in the cocoa belt -- perhaps a s many 
as 200,000 mi g rant laborers who received only a third of the 
crop while the landowners ke.pt two-t·fiirds -- were effectively 
halted; it was argu ed they mi g ht weaken the cocoa farmers. 
the 'ba ckbone of the n a tion.' Trade unions were, as Davidson 
shows, gradu~1 lly weakened a nd tied into the Par ty }tructure . 
Accept ance of ort hod ox west e rn advice st il~tt'~l~g pedd led 
t,--
t h roug h ou t Africa -- to c ont rol wages in the f a ce of ristng 
prices "alienated the masses of wage earners. 
Nkrumah 's lack of understanding of this growing conflict 
was a critical bause of his failure to even attempt to b uild 
the CPP ar ound t he urban workers and r ural poor who might have 
~~'?..tS:J 
pressured the party and state machinery tntolrneaningful efforts 
to _restructure the political eco 1~omy. 
Secondly, despite his scathing attacks on neo-colonialism 
and verbal endorsement of soc i.alism, _ Nkrumah and his party 
failed to 9 ~fr- the key to initia r ing an effective transitional 
stag e towards a more nationally integrated; balanced economy 
capable of attaining meaninful economic independence; namely, 
state control of the 'commanding heig hts': basic i ndustry, 
the banks, export-import and interna l wnolesale trade. No 
mea9ures were adopted to acnieve state control of the prof ltable 
Ashanti goldmines; only t hose which were unpro fitable were taken 
l 
over. The State Enterprises Corporation, ~ r- reated to manage 
Ghanaian participation in industry~ was essentially a typical 
aut·onomous British developme r. t corporation. Like its :... cbunter.;:;. --
parts in other newly-independent African states, it sought to 
implement an import-substitution indu strialization program .. 
~.:fn the context of Ghana's distorted inherited market, 1"hi'.5 
could only serve to reinfor ce the nation's external de pendence 
on foreign firms for rnachj_nery, equipment, PE3rts and materials 
to meet the luxury and seml-luxury demands of the narrow hig h 
/"\ 
income group associated with export-enclave g row-tho No long 
term industrial strategy was f ormulc1 ted to spread productive 
employment opportunitie s into all reg ions of an increa$ ing ly 
integrA.ted economy capable of raising the living standards of 
the broad ma sses of tne population. The banks were left entirely 
in the hands of th e foreig n fi.rms (Barclays, now closely associ-
ated with the Bank of America, and the Bank of West Africa, a 
member of the Standard Group 1.n wh ich Chase - Manhattan owns 
15 percent of the shares); the only exception was a small, 
supposecl:ly 'compe titive' state bank. ·The state_. operated 
importing house, GNTC, was managed by a· former Un~ ed Africa 
Co~_pany off icialp· still on pension to the latter comr.arny. 
It should not be surpiising that, as Ghana's cocoa farmers 
doubled the ir output from 1955 to 1965, the continued exter-
nal dependence of the political economy left the nation entir ely 
vulnerable to the collapse of world cocoa prices. 
-
Third, Nkrumah's efforts to build pan-African unity did 
much, as Davidson emphasizes. to help lay the foundation for 
the Organisation of African Unity. But the same problems that 
led. to Nkrumah's downfall in Ghana plagued the continental 
organization. As long as the heads of state represent the 
-6-
newly emergent classes which benefit from the status ~ 
the OAU cannot effect ively ac hie~-.e the kind of unity requ i red 
to build continental political-economic independence 0 
David son concludes: 
The view f or t omorrow is theref ore t na t Nkrumah's 
aim s were t he r i [.'ht one s , and ,t ha t their r eA lj_ u:i.t ion 
will becom e increasing ly p ossible as cond itions ripen, 
and as other s trat eg ist s take up the further strugle 
for liberation. These s tra t eg ists will succeeq in the 
measure tha t circumstances, as well as tneir insigh t 
and cuurag e, enable t hem to do whRt Nkrumah did not do, 
or · could not do : in the measure tha t they undertake 
and carry t hrough[ t he work of bu ilding democratic or-
ganizations wh ic h beccme t ne vehicles of mass partici-
pation as well as ma ss sup port movements in wn lch tne . 
ri ass of ord i na.r y peopl e rea lly ' make , en shrine and up-
hold the fundamental law of tne land .'." 
To succeed; th~se strategi s ts will need to learn the pr i-
mary lessons of Nkrumah's failure: 'They will need to build 
t heir political base around the masses of urban workers a nd 
unemployed, as well as t 11e e xploited rural poor, imbuing t hem 
with a. · conscious ideology :{ ocused on the need for structural 
chang e. On this foundation, they must formulate a long term 
development s trategy 
making the essential 
to restructure the politica l economy, 
10!..t tb.t. wV; tA~ J 
, _, .. ..-... ,..-, .-_ .... - ..... M· · -~· ~·· .. - ,. 
institutional changes Lin the er it ica l 
A.rea of the 'commandlng heig hts' to ensure its im plementation. 
Ov~r t irne, it is to be hoped that those _ who ernb$.rk on this 
path, armed with courag e and patience, will weld Africa's J50-
the 
million population into i. powerful industrialized continental 
power of which Nkrumah dreamed. 
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